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Countries which default 
on their foreign debt tend 
to experience a decline in 
their trade with the rest of 
the world. 
In a recent research paper, 
Robert Zymek provides 
an explanation for this 
empirical finding: reduced 
access to international 
capital markets in the wake 
of sovereign debt crises 
can account for most of 
the observed impact of 
sovereign default on trade.
Sovereign Default and 
International Trade
What are the economic costs of 
sovereign default? This question 
has haunted the literature on 
foreign borrowing from its 
inception. Since foreign creditors 
cannot rely on courts to enforce 
their claims on sovereign 
governments, the adverse 
economic effects of sovereign debt 
crises may be the main reason why 
countries usually choose to repay 
what they owe. One frequently 
cited claim is that governments 
fear being shut out from 
international trade if they renege 
on their contracts with foreigners.
Recent research by Rose (2005) 
and Martinez and Sandleris (2008) 
suggests that countries do indeed 
experience a decline in their trade 
with the rest of the world following 
sovereign debt renegotiations. 
However, these studies do not 
explain why this would be the case. 
Is the decline in trade the result of 
deliberate trade sanctions imposed 
by creditors? Or is the causality 
reversed, and countries default in 
anticipation of lower imports and 
exports?
Zymek (2012) proposes and test 
for an alternative explanation: 
sovereign default causes a decline 
in trade because it reduces 
exporters’ access to foreign credit. 
As Table 1 below shows, countries 
which experienced sovereign debt 
crises in the period 1980-2007 
were less financially developed 
than non-defaulters, and more 
dependent on international 
capital markets. Most of these 
countries were running significant 
current account deficits prior to 
default, and two thirds of the 
subsequent default episodes were 
accompanied by a drop in net 
foreign borrowing.
Table 1. Economic Characteristics of Defaulters, 1980-2007
             Median
      Defaulter Non-Defaulter
Domestic Creditc2007/GDPc2007      0.29       0.84
Avg. Financial Dependence of Expc2007     0.22       0.28
Avg. CAct/GDPct in 2 Years Prior to Default    -0.08          -
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If default reduces exporters’ 
access to external financing, it 
should cause a larger decline in the 
exports of sectors which are more 
dependent on external funds. 
The paper tests this hypothesis 
formally, employing a difference-
in-difference approach in the spirit 
of Rajan and Zingales (1998), and 
finds strong support for it in the 
data.
Figure 1 above provides an 
illustrative glimpse of the main 
result. It plots the average 
financial dependence of exports 
for six countries which experienced 
at least one sovereign default in 
the last thirty years. Sovereign 
defaults (vertical lines) tend to 
coincide with declines in the 
average financial dependence of 
exports, indicating a shift in the 
composition of exports away from 
highly financially dependent and 
toward less financially vulnerable 
goods. The paper establishes the 
generality of this observation 
econometrically and shows that it 
is robust to changes in specification 
and sample composition.
Based on countries’ export 
composition leading up to each of 
the 61 default episodes covered 
in the paper, on average, the 
financial-dependence-related effect 
of default should have caused a 
7% decline in exports for three 
years. Rose (2005) and Martinez 
and Sandleris (2008) find an overall 
decline in trade flows of 6-11% for 
comparable periods. This suggests 
that the financial-dependence 
channel highlighted in Zymek (2012) 
can explain most of the impact of 
sovereign default on trade.
The fact that countries suffer 
exclusion from international 
capital markets in the wake of 
sovereign debt crises has been 
well documented (e.g. Gelos et 
al., 2003). The observed decline 
in trade appears to be merely a 
symptom of such capital-market 
exclusion, rather than a cost of 
default in its own right. Much of 
the recent literature on sovereign 
borrowing treats the threat of 
capital-market exclusion and the 
risk of “trade costs” as substitutable 
explanations for why countries 
repay their debts. Zymek (2012) 
suggests that this notion is 
mistaken: if default does not reduce 
the defaulting country’s access to 
international lending, the “trade 
costs” of default may also fail to 
materialize.
Figure 1: Avg. Financial Dependence of Exports
